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Rights and Remedies
Marsha S. Berzon*
Coming here to participate in a lecture series named in honor of
Judge Alvin and Janice Rubin is, for me, an occasion of great
personal significance. In the summer of 1968, my husband Stephen
and I arrived for Stephen's clerkship with Alvin Rubin, then a district
judge in New Orleans. Judge and Mrs. Rubin invited us to stay with
them while we went apartment hunting, and continued throughout the
year to be surrogate parents, inviting us to share holiday events and
other special occasions with their family. I would visit chambers
occasionally and meet Judge Rubin and Stephen for lunch.
I was at the time twenty-three years old. Alvin Rubin was the first
federal judge-indeed, the first judge-I had ever met. I had not yet
gone to law school, nor had I any plan to do so. I certainly had no
thought that I would ever follow Alvin Rubin into the federal
judiciary.
But life takes strange turns, and subliminal influences often take
over when one is least expecting them. I spent that year quietly
observing Judge Rubin's combination of wit and wisdom; of
enormous intelligence, broad knowledge, and good common sense;
of hard work and preservation of time for friends and family; and of
a profound commitment to both individualized justice and the
development of sound, well-articulated legal doctrine. Most of all, I
recognized that a man of great depth with an unwavering commitment
to making the world a better place had found fulfillment in the law.
By the end of the year, both Stephen and I had absorbed a vision of
a life worth living, as well as a sense that personal attributes and
devotion, not family connections or social status, would determine
whether one attained such a life.
So I have no doubt that when, a year later, I decided to apply to
law school, Judge Rubin's model informed my choice. That he was
a rare lawyer, and an even rarer judge, was something I learned only
over the following years.
When I was nominated to the federal judiciary, Judge Rubin had,
sadly, already passed away. I remember invoking his name at the first
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of my two lengthy confirmation hearings-the atmosphere
surrounding judicial confirmation hearings was very different in 1998
and 1999 from what it had been in 1977, the year Judge Rubin was
confirmed to the old Fifth Circuit-as the ideal to which I aspired as
a judge, which indeed he was and is. While awaiting confirmation,
I thought often that I would so have liked to be able to sit down with
JudgeRubin if I ever reached the bench to ask him for a roadmap, a
guidebook, to the role and life of ajudge.
Then, when the Senate finally voted and I indeed became ajudge,
a box of educational materials arrived from the Federal Judicial
Center to prepare me for my new endeavor. In the box was a several-
years-old tape recording of a conversation among four federal court
of appeals judges chosen for their wisdom and wide respect. Among
those judges, thank goodness but not surprisingly, was Alvin Rubin.
So I had my tutorial from Judge Rubin after all, about how to prepare
for argument, how to choose and work with law clerks, and how to
undertake the myriad other daily tasks that absorb judges as they try
both to get through the caseload and to provide litigants with the
careful attention they are due.
As I embarked on my life as a judge four years ago, I drew on the
practical advice Judge Rubin imparted in that taped conversation.
But I also thought often about a very specific and critically important
lesson concerning the legal system that Judge Rubin taught me in his
courtroom in 1969.
Before Judge Rubin that year was the school desegregation case
in Tangipahoa Parish. I remember Judge Rubin looking down from
the bench, drawing on his considerable ability to appear both
formidable and folksy at the same time, saying to the lawyers and
parents before him something like: "Brown v. Board of Education
was decided in 1954. My son Michael was just starting school at the
time. Michael has now gone off to college, yet in Tangipahoa Parish
black and white children still are not going to school together. So a
black child who was five or six when Michael was would have gone
entirely through school by now, always in segregated schools. That
is not how our legal system works, and I am not going to allow it to
continue." And he issued an injunction to ensure that it would not,'
while the other Louisiana district judges that year faced with similar
cases failed to do so--and were promptly reversed by the Fifth
Circuit, while Judge Rubin was affirmed.2
The African-American children in Tangipahoa Parish had a right
to attend integrated schools as soon as Brown was decided. So a
1. See Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. La.
1969).
2. Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 417 F.2d 801, 812 (5th Cir. 1969).
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group of lawyers brought suit on their behalf under a post-Civil War
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that allows civil suits for "redress" against
persons "who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ... subject[] ... any citizen.., to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws..." The problem Judge Rubin wrestled with
that day in 1969 and sought to resolve is that a declaration of federal
rights, whether by Congress or by a court, is most often insufficient
as a practical matter, as it was in the 1950s and 1960s with regard to
school desegregation, to bring about the change in people's lives full
recognition of those rights would entail. Without means to oblige
implementation of legal rights by those who would otherwise violate
them-without the "redress" that Section 1983 contemplates-the
declaration by courts or legislatures of those rights remains
aspirational only. Judge Rubin had no trouble so recognizing, and
placed the authority of the federal courts behind an order that the
African-American children had the right to attend integrated schools
not as an abstract proposition but as a day-to-day, operational reality.
Judge Rubin's appointment to the federal bench by Lyndon
Johnson came at a unique moment of course - during the 1960s civil
rights movement-but then, as now, in his words: "[T]o succeed [in
federal court] ... plaintiffs must prove that ... defendants have in
some fashion violated federal law and that, under the tests the law
directs the court to apply, they are entitled to [relief]."4 My aim in
this lecture is to illuminate a bit of Judge Rubin's deceptively self-
evident truth, by exploring the ways in which federal "rights" and
"remedies," familiar concepts to judges new and old, have become
focal points of contestation in the last thirty years. In those years, the
federal courts have made the relationship between rights and
remedies increasingly complex and contingent, with the result that
courts are often faced with situations in which ascertainable rights
cannot be enforced. Litigants are therefore at times not treated in
accord with their recognized legal rights. Across the span of a single
generation, the definitions of legally cognizable federal rights and
remedies have changed considerably, indeed to an extent that makes
one wonder if in today's legal landscape the "unlikely heros" of Judge
Rubin's Fifth Circuit would find the legal tools that were at their
disposal.'
These developments are my subject. My ruminations include
some concern that cutting off judicial redress for violations of
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4. Jones v. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 390 F. Supp. 579, 584 (E.D. La.
1974).
5. See generally Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes (1981).
2004]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
recognized legal rights in pursuit of various other, independently
legitimate ends has costs for which the federal courts in recent years
have not fully accounted.
To set the scene, and to emphasize the primacy that was attached
to individual rights enforcement in federal courts during most of
Judge Rubin's tenure, let me describe the case that became the
inaugural argument of the Supreme Court's 2003 term. Frew v.
Hawkins was heard on October 7 and concerned the authority of
federal judges to enforce consent decrees, akin to court-supervised
contracts, against state officials despite a state's claimed sovereign
immunity. Sovereign immunity, for the uninitiated, is a concept of
ancient origin that has, through the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution-in a series of five-to-
four opinions countered by lengthy, contentious dissents 6-- become
a major limitation on citizens' ability to enforce against state
governmental entities rights conferred by federal statutes as well as
by the Constitution.
Absent knowledge ofFrew's recent pedigree, one would not have
been surprised had it arisen in the 1960s; the district court judge,
William Wayne Justice of Texas, is no stranger to cases of that
decade, having also been appointed to the district court, like Judge
Rubin, by President Johnson. An anecdote Judge Justice relates gives
a sense of his views on rights and remedies:
Back about 1974, I was invited to the Aspen Institute for
Humanistic Studies for a week-long symposium. The main
participants were judges involved in institutional reform
litigation. On about the fourth day, we were joined by
then-Chief Justice Warren Burger, who took a seat directly
across the table from me. In the course of discussing a paper
prepared by Professor Abram Chayes, I advanced the
proposition that, if a state has a function to perform, and does
not perform that function, so that people are injured in their
Constitutional rights, it is the duty of the federal courts to
intervene to protect those rights. Justice Burger, without
batting an eye, pronounced my views
unconstitutional-which was the quickest reversal I've ever
experienced. Government officials have a right not to take
action, Chief Justice Burger said. They might have other
priorities in mind. I thought he was wrong at the time, and I
still do.7
6. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.
Ct. 955 (2001).
7. William Wayne Justice, Thurgood Marshall Medal of Justice Award:
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As one news account put it, Frew:
challenges the power of federal courts to enforce their
judgments, bringing to the fore many states' unhappiness with
long-running federal court supervision of state institutional
reforms .... [M]any states have found that consent decrees
become frozen, instead of being 'dynamic' documents, said [a]
Utah Assistant Attorney General... who filed an amicus brief
for 19 states supporting Texas.8
The consent decree at issue was signed in 1996 between the state
defendants and indigent mothers who sued Texas officials for failing
to provide their children with health care under a federal-state Medicaid
program. Judge Justice certified a class of one-and-a-half million
children and retained supervisory jurisdiction over the consent decree.
In 1998, the plaintiffs filed suit to enforce the decree, alleging
violations. The state responded in part that the Eleventh Amendment
bars enforcement of the decree and that, in addition, the decree's
provisions exceed the scope of the federal Medicaid law. In a 100-page
opinion, Judge Justice rejected the officials' arguments, stating that
their proposed "outcome would detract from the integrity of the court
by allowing state defendants to avoid bargained-for obligations while
receiving the benefit of escaping litigation and potential liability."9
For my purposes, the most relevant passage in the district court
opinion concerns its jurisdiction to enforce the decree. Judge Justice,
in the spirit of the institutional reform litigation common during the
civil rights movement, held that "to sustain federal court jurisdiction.
. the remedies in the decree must only serve to: 1) resolve a dispute
within the court's subject matter jurisdiction, 2) come within the
general scope of the case made by the pleadings, and 3) further the
objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based."'" Judge
Justice also proceeded to apply a test not required in the civil rights era,
that of examining under a recent Supreme Court decision, Blessing v.
Freestone"1 (to which I shall return, and which was, incidently, the
next-to-last Supreme Court case I argued as an advocate), whether the
Medicaid Act as imported by the consent decree permitted redress for
the plaintiffs. He had no trouble finding that it did.'2
Remarks, 7 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 413, 413 (2000).
8. Marcia Coyle, Sleeper Case on the High Court Docket, Can States be Held
to Consent Decrees?, Nat'l L.J., October 6, 2003, at 1 (Col. 3).
9. Frew v. Gilbert, 109 F. Supp.2d 579, 671 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
10. Id. at 666 (citing Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3077 (1986)).
11. 520U.S. 329, 117 S. Ct. 1353 (1997).
12. Frew, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
2004] 523
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The Fifth Circuit reversed. 3 Judge Justice erred, in the court's
view, by failing to determine "whether each alleged violation of the
consent decree was a statutory violation actionable under
Blessing."'4 Moreover, the defendants were held not to have waived
their Eleventh Amendment immunity merely by entering the
consent decree: "[A] state can waive its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by voluntarily invoking the federal court's jurisdiction,
but in the pending case the State did not do so; the state officials
were sued as defendants."' 5  The consent decree was thereby
rendered effectively unenforceable.
I use this case as an illustration of the doctrinal hurdles that
today's federal Section 1983 plaintiffs encounter, and as a rare
contemporary instance of attempted structural reform of a type
prevalent in the civil rights era. Contrast the Fifth Circuit's
decision in the Medicaid case with the memorable Shakespearean
reference Judge Rubin used in upholding a decree by the same
judge, Judge Justice. Affirming Judge Justice in a case challenging
the Texas Department of Corrections' conditions of confinement,
Ruiz v. Estelle, described as "the most comprehensive civil action
suit in correctional law history," 6 Judge Rubin wrote for the Fifth
Circuit in 1982:
The implementation of the district court's decree can
become a ceaseless guerilla war, with endless hearings,
opinions, and appeals, and incalculable costs. But it is
instead to be hoped that, if the state adopts the policy that
inmates must be accorded their constitutional rights and that
prison officials will not be permitted to indulge in petty
practices designed to deny those rights, the period ofjudicial
supervision can more speedily be concluded ....
[C]onstitutional peace is the consummation devoutly to be
wished.' 7
13. Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2002).
14. Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 550 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The U.S. Solicitor General
joined the plaintiffs in arguing at the Supreme Court that the Fifth Circuit's
Eleventh Amendment holding was wrong. The Court's decision unanimously
reversed the Fifth Circuit without deciding the waiver issue, emphasizing that:
"Federal courts are not reduced to approving consent decrees and hoping for
compliance. Once entered, a consent decree may be enforced." Frew ex rel. Frew
v. Hawkins, 504 U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 899 (2004).
16. David I. Levine, The Seven Virtues ofJudging: Alvin Rubin 's Civil Rights
Opinions, 52 La. L. Rev. 1499, 1509-10 & n.52 (1992) (quoting Ben M. Crouch
& James W. Marguart, An Appeal to Justice: Litigated Reform of Texas Prisons
2 (1989)).
17. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982).
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The type of sweeping remedy enforced by Judge Rubin's court is
exceedingly uncommon these days. What scholars like Owen Fiss,
by no means a dispassionate observer, and Abram Chayes identified
in the 1970s as "structural injunctions" have receded from the
remedial scene. Fiss defined a "structural injunction" as "the formal
medium through which the judiciary seeks to reorganize ongoing
bureaucratic organizations so as to bring them into conformity with
the Constitution," adding that:
[t]he structural injunction represents the most distinctive
contribution to our remedial jurisprudence drawn from the
civil rights experience . . . .The fate of the structural
injunction has also been tied to that of the civil rights
movement. The remedy grew in power and scope over a
twenty-year period, beginning in 1954 and continuing until
1974. '
More recently, federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court,
have tended to be reluctant not just to accord broad structural
remedies, but to accord any remedies at all in many instances, even
when federal constitutional and statutory rights have been violated.
Part of the reaction to broad judicial remedies, quite an
understandable one, is that, as federal District Judge James Brady put
it here in Baton Rouge recently when signing a settlement agreement
in a desegregation case after 47 years of litigation, "at some point the
law ends and people begin."' 9 My concern, however, is that, as is
often the case with reactivejurisprudence, aversion to broad remedies
has gone overboard in the other direction, with the result that
individuals seeking narrow, traditional judicial remedies, in no way
"structural" in the sense used approvingly by Professor Fiss and by
others with opprobrium, are not able to obtain them.
For Judge Brady's truism cuts both ways. There are times when
people cannot begin meaningfully to assert their own rights without
assistance from the courts. Then law must come before people are
abandoned to social forces.
For example: No one of age in Louisiana at the time Judge Rubin
served in the New Orleans district court can forget that here, as in
many other states, the law was an indispensable source of redress
against real, palpable, widely-acknowledged injustice. Leander Perez
Sr., the President of the Plaquemines Parish Council, is chronicled in
the House Select Committee on Assassinations' report on the deaths
18. Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 965, 965
(1993). The original title of Fiss's lecture was "Public Law Remedies in the
Nineties: The Rehnquist Court's War on the Civil Rights Injunction."
19. Desegregation Suit in La. Is Settled After 47 Years, Wash. Post, Aug. 15,
2003, at A7 (stating that Judge Brady was paraphrasing William Faulkner).
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of President Kennedy and Dr. King as a "Louisiana political boss
and virulent segregationist."2  He was "a virtual dictator in
Plaquemines Parish."2  As Jack Bass, the author of Unlikely
Heroes, a history of the old Fifth Circuit during the civil rights era
underscores, "in Plaquemines Parish, Leander Perez was the law. 23
It is worth quoting at length the account of one lawyer who
litigated against the Perez regime:
Plaquemines Parish had been run since the twenties by
Judge Leander Perez, who had been a state district judge
from 1920 to '24. He still used the title and was really the
king or the emperor of Plaquemines Parish, which was an
extraordinarily mineral-wealthy piece of land .... Judge
Perez had put through a constitutional amendment in
Louisiana to create a separate special form of government in
that Parish so that everything was controlled by the Parish
Council. The president of the Council was Judge Perez, the
district attorney was Leander Perez Jr., and the vice
president of the Council was ... the judge's older son. They
had tremendous wealth. If you wanted to get a license to
look for sulphur or other minerals or oil in Plaquemines
Parish, you needed to get a license from the Parish Council,
and you could not get a license from the Parish Council
unless you hired the Perez law firm to prepare this little
form and submit it. The standing fee was literally a million
dollars for a five-minute piece of work.... [Perez] was one
of the people who first began to distribute the phony
Protocols of the Elders of Zion and a number of other racist,
anti-Semitic publications. He's the man who bragged that
if Martin Luther King ever came to Plaquemines Parish,
they had bought a little island in the Mississippi that was
snake-infested and that had an old Spanish prison fort on it,
and that's where Dr. King would be imprisoned if he tried
to do anything in Plaquemines Parish. Perez was also
excommunicated by the Archbishop of New Orleans
because he physically tried to prevent the integration of the
Catholic schools there in 1962 and '63.23
20. Doe v. Doe, 941 F.2d 280, 281 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting the March 1979
Report in a section on Dr. King's assassination).
21. Peyton McCrary, Bringing Equality to Power: How the Federal Courts
Transformed the Electoral Structure of Southern Politics, 1960-1990, 5 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 665, 671 (2003).
22. Bass, supra note 5, at 289.
23. Alvin J. Bronstein, Representing the Powerless: Lawyers Can Make a
Difference, 49 Me. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
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In one typical denunciation of Plaquemines practices, the Fifth
Circuit noted that:
[t]he School Board's brief begins by stating: 'This is not a
typical school integration case....' This statement could not
be more true. This Court recalls no record in any school case
which revealed so graphically official attempts to destroy a
public school system and to flout the mandates of the United
States Constitution as interpreted by the federal courts.2 4
The Fifth Circuit also had occasion to grant relief for bad faith
prosecution of Gary Duncan,2 the African-American whose other
legacy for this Plaquemines Parish prosecution is Duncan v.
Louisiana,26 a landmark Supreme Court case holding that a defendant
in a misdemeanor case facing a substantial prison sentence-more
than six months-is entitled to a jury trial. Also arising from the
same events was Sobol v. Perez,27 a three-judge district court ruling
that enjoined the prosecution of Duncan's attorney for practicing law
without a Louisiana license. The extensive trial concluded that
Richard Sobol's prosecution was unconstitutional because without
out-of-state civil rights lawyers, the rights of African-Americans in
the Plaquemines Parish of that day could not be protected.28
Without access to legal representation-it was Sobol, the out-of-
state lawyer, who represented Duncan in his Supreme Court
case-and without a federal judiciary willing to provide meaningful
relief, the dire situation in Plaquemines Parish would, I trust, have
changed anyway, but much more slowly than it did, and with an
unacceptable cost in injustice and truncated opportunities in life for
many individuals. And, while the possibility of a repeat of the show
trials in 1960s Plaquemines Parish is slim, there are several reasons
why the availability offederal remedies remains critical.
First, Section 1983, the bulwark statute for federal civil rights
litigation, applies in state as well as federal court. Limitations on its
application curtail remedies available in state as well as federal court.
So, for example, the Supreme Court has mirrored the Eleventh
Amendment/sovereign immunity ban on suing states in federal court
with a ruling in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police that
states may not be sued in state court under Section 1983 either,
24. Plaquenines Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817, 835 n.29 (5th
Cir. 1969).
25. Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971).
26. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968).
27. Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968).
28. An interesting side note is that the young lawyer representing the United
States in Sobol, and supporting the plaintiff, was future Professor Owen Fiss.
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because they are not "persons" within the meaning of Section 1983.29
Similarly, the recent limitations on suing for violations of federal
statutes under Section 1983 that I will discuss apply in state as well
as federal court.
Second, as the Supreme Court has also held, in Alden v. Maine 30
states may refuse on sovereign immunity grounds to provide relief in
their own courts for violations by the state of federally-conferred
rights, and often do.
Third, many state court judges are elected and do not serve, as do
federal judges, for life, assuming "good Behavior," with the result
that they can be, and have been, ousted from office if they provide
remedies to unpopular individuals for violations of federal rights.
More likely than not, most elected state judges carry a sense of this
reality, consciously or otherwise, with them in their daily work.3'
And fourth, finally, and to my mind most important: As the
Supreme Court said in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape, the "federal remedy
is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first
sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. 32 What that
means to me is that federal rights are sufficiently important that in
many instances we provide more than one forum in which they can be
vindicated. This structural protection guards against the inadequacy
of a single forum, whether that inadequacy arises from corruption,
politicization, or simple inattention (the last being a real possibility
in otherwise well-intentioned but vastly overburdened courts, and one
well worth protecting against).
As the crest of the civil rights movement receded, and the Warren
Court passed as well around the same time, doctrines developed that
limit federal courts' authority to provide redress for the violation of
federal rights. These doctrines-promulgated largely by Supreme
Court decisions, and in lesser part by acts of Congress-both shaped
and were shaped by a particular view of the proper role of the federal
courts in our constitutional system.
To give some examples: In suits for damages alleging a violation
of constitutional rights, state and local officials can only be held liable
for damages if it would be clear to a reasonable official that his
conduct was unlawful. So individuals whose constitutional rights
29. 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).
30. 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
31. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill ofRights and the States: The Revival
of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535,
551 (1986) ("It cannot be denied that state court judges are often more immediately
subject to majoritarian pressures than federal courts, and are correspondingly less
independent than their federal counterparts." (quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
32. 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S. Ct. 473, 482 (1961) (emphasis added).
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have in fact been violated can be without remedy if the violators
should not, in the law's view, have realized that they were infringing
protected liberties.33
My point is not that this rule of qualified immunity makes poor
sense. Individual government employees should not have to pay
damages for a constitutional injury that they really did not know, and
should not have known, they inflicted. Also, as the Supreme Court
has made clear, courts must first decide whether a plaintiffs
constitutional rights were violated and only then turn to the immunity
question.34 It may well be, as Professor Jeffries of the University of
Virginia has noted,35 that the impact of the immunity rule is to
counteract a tendency by many courts to slow the development of
constitutional doctrine if the cost is imposition of liability on
governmental employees without palpable fault.
Still, for a variety of reasons-including the sovereign immunity
concept I discussed earlier-individuals whose constitutional rights
are violated by government officials may have no recourse other than
a suit for damages against the offending official. One result of
precluding such recourse is a gap between rights and remedies that
can create an understandable resentment in the individuals affected,
leading to the conclusion that they have been treated unjustly.
Another is unending litigation in courts, such as mine, concerning not
the prospective merits of constitutional issues but, instead, the
backwards-looking, ultimately unproductive inquiry of when and to
what degree a given constitutional right was enunciated in the past.
A second example of the overall phenomenon, before I get to the
primary area I wish to discuss, is habeas corpus law as it now exists
under a statute passed by Congress in 1996, the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act.36 Under AEDPA, as it is known, state
prisoners can obtain a remedy in federal court for unconstitutional
convictions only if they can show that any state court decision
concerning their asserted constitutional rights was "contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court . . . ," The sensible
rationales for limiting habeas relief are, first, a need for finality in
criminal proceedings and, second, respect for state courts, such that
33. See Saucierv. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2001) ("If
the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable ... the officer is
entitled to the immunity defense.").
34. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2515 (2002).
35. John C. Jefferies, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts. 110 Yale L.J.
259 (2000); John C. Jefferies, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law,
109 Yale L.J. 87 (1999).
36. Pub. L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
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their decisions should not be overturned unless insubordinate or
unreasonable. And because AEDPA is the balance Congress has
struck, it is the one we judges enforce. Still, it seems to me important
not to lose sight of the fact that that balance leaves people in prison
-and subjects some of them to execution-even though their
constitutional rights as understood under contemporary doctrine were
violated when they were convicted. Once again, in pursuit of
competing interests, the law leaves persons with no redress for the
violation of their constitutional rights.
The limiting doctrine that will be the focus of this lecture,
however, is neither of these developments but rather one manifested
in two other lines of Supreme Court decisions. First, cases
questioned whether a federal remedy is always available for the
violation of a federal right. Now, some cases question whether a
cognizable federal "right" exists in the first place. This play in two
parts-first, the limiting of federal remedies, and then the limiting of
federal rights-is by no means complete, and the question I wish to
address is how the next act should be written.
My thesis, like the episodic restrictions on the ability of federal
courts to fashion remedies for the violation of federal rights, also
comes in two parts, and may appear somewhat anomalous on the
surface. First, as a matter of legal analysis, vigilance in keeping
rights and remedies conceptually separate is salutary, because the two
are often confused in both legal and lay circles. And that confusion,
I intend to demonstrate, can effect tremendous harm to legal doctrine
and to individual rights enforcement. Second, as important as the
distinction between rights and remedies is to clear legal analysis,
resulting rules that exalt rights yet deny remedies create a blind spot
in the courts' ability to further justice and, at the same time, diminish
the public's perception of courts as justice-assuring institutions,
thereby undermining confidence in the judiciary. A foundational
tenet of our legal tradition is that courts are directed to fashion a
remedy after finding an incursion on a right. For the sake of the legal
system, this maxim should not be discarded lightly.
Before embarking upon my investigation of rights and remedies,
however, I should delineate the boundaries of this discussion. First,
I limit my remarks to federal rights. It goes without saying that many
of the most important rights we enjoy daily-the right to enforce a
contract, the right to exclude trespassers, the right to expect
objectively reasonable behavior from others-are not federal. They
are secured by the states. The subject of my analysis, however, will
be federal rights, which have historically served the purpose of
creating nationwide liberty and equality and conferring fundamental
entitlements.
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Second, as stated earlier, I aim to discuss the role of federal
courts. State courts are indispensable to securing individual
rights.38 Nonetheless, my focus on federal courts is justifiable
because these institutions are available to everyone, regardless of
the coincidence of state geography.
Finally, and I will only briefly state this point now because I will
give it full consideration below, when I speak of the need for
remedies, I mean the availability of an affirmative judicial
remedy---or, in other words, the ability to go to court and sue for
relief. There are, of course, ways in which we enjoy rights that do
not involve the ability to bring a suit in court.3 9
With these preliminaries aside, I begin with a convenient clich6,
originally one of those eye-glazing Latin legal maxims, that was
famously recited in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v.
Madison: "where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy."4  When put that way, the proposition is misleading-so
long as my rights are being respected, I neither have, nor need, a
legal remedy. Rights do not appear only when they are infringed,
however. The mystery of the clich6 is dispelled by quoting Chief
Justice Marshall's complete sentence, which was taken from
Blackstone: "[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy,.., whenever that right is invaded."4' This leaves us with
38. For a complementary article by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Texas that discusses the right to a legal remedy in state constitutions, see Thomas
R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1309, 1310
(2003) (noting that "the guarantee of a right of access to the courts to obtain a
remedy for injury... expressly or implicitly appears in forty state constitutions");
see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
39. The declarative fimction of rights should not be ignored in our search for
associated remedies. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 52 (1979) ("Rights operate in the realm of abstraction, remedies
in the world of practical reality. A right is a particularized and authoritative
declaration of meaning."). Modem innovations such as truth and reconciliation
commissions are based on the premise that official acknowledgment of the breach
of individual rights provides its own modest salve for a victim's dignity. See
generally Jamie L. Wacks, A Proposalfor Community-Based Racial Reconciliation
in the United States Through Personal Stories, 7 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 195,
197-98 (2000) (discussing "the pain that individuals experience as a result of
racism, including intentional and many times more subtle forms of discrimination
that do not rise to the level of legal claims" and proposing an American variant of
the South African commission model to address the problem). Certain provisions
of international law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, also
emphasize agreement on rights at the expense of or to the exclusion of remedies.
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
41. Id. (quoting 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,
ch. 7) (emphasis added).
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a less imprecise clich6, but a clich6 nonetheless, and one that does
little prescriptive work for courts seeking guidance on the right-
remedy relationship.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence of the last thirty years could
be characterized as running counter to Marbury: not every invaded
right necessitates a remedy, at least not a federal remedy.
Beginning at least in the 1970s but, if one follows the threads
carefully, well before that, the Supreme Court created analytical
sustenance for the proposition that disembodied federal rights exist
for which federal judicial remedies for affected individuals were
never provided. As a result of this change in approach, rights and
remedies, it seems, are no longer conjoined concepts.
One diagnosis of what has transpired since Congress and the
Supreme Court have limited the ability of the federal courts to
provide redress for violations of rights is that we have lost sight of
the analytic unity between rights and remedies, as reflected in the
Marbury clich. 4 This is not the problem. Rights and remedies
have always been conceptually distinct. "Right" and "remedy" are
not just two names for the same thing.
On reflection, this seems quite clear. A right is a tripartite
relationship among a person, other persons, and the state; it is one
person's protected ability to make claims on or against others. The
landowner's right to exclude, for example, is his ability to
determine whether another person may enter his land. Coupled with
this right is his discrete power to do something about a violation of
the right. Our landowner-at common law, at least-had two sorts
of remedies: First, he had self-help; that is, a limited ability to take
matters into his own hands and exclude or remove the trespasser
without the involvement of the courts. Alternatively, he could bring
an action in court for trespass or ejectment. This latter remedy,
which relies on the power of a court to issue an enforceable order,
is a cause of action or a right of action. a3 Regardless of which
remedy is chosen, the state is involved: either it supplies and
empowers the courts that deliver thejudicial remedy, or it grants the
landowner some limited impunity for his use of force against the
trespasser. While self-help violence has, fortunately, largely fallen
into desuetude, the point remains that possession of a right is
conceptually antecedent to the existence of a judicial remedy.
42. Cf. Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (K.B. 1703) (Holt, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Where a man has but one remedy to come at his right, if he loses that
he loses his right.").
43. The confusion over rights and remedies often stumbles over the fact that a
"cause of action" is also termed a "right of action," leading some to assume that any
right is just a right of action. An idiom does not an argument make, however.
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There are countless ways of trying to describe a right. Whether
we follow Justice Holmes, who termed it "a permission [on the part
of the rights-holder] to exercise certain natural powers, and upon
certain conditions to obtain protection, restitution, or compensation
by the aid of the public force," or Immanuel Kant, who treated
rights as restrictions on each person's actions, again backed up by
the coercive power of the state,45 the central point remains that the
existence of an affirmativejudicial remedy or a right of action is but
one way the state may step in to support a claim of right. That
rights come before judicial remedies is reflected in the language of
the Declaration of Independence itself, which embodies the notion
of natural rights: "[A]ll men are created equal, [and] endowed by
their creator with certain unalienable Rights.... [T]o secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men." The idea is that
rights exist logically, if not temporally, prior to the existence of a
state capable of providing a remedy for their infringement.
Not only do rights come before and have consequences apart
from judicial remedies, but they also have jurisprudential value
even when no affirmative right of action exists. The Fourth
Amendment's "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures" limits the government's authority to do certain things. It
is the fact that we have this right- not the possibility that, should
it be infringed, we might eventually be compensated-that provides
the assurances of liberty and privacy the Fourth Amendment grants.
The "right to be left alone" matters because we want to be left
alone. Again, it is the prophylactic effect of the right, not our
ability to sue intruders, that we value. When evidence is taken in an
illegal search, the modem approach is first and foremost to exclude
the illegal evidence from consideration. This is not a "remedy" in
the common law sense- it is not compensation for the right
violated, unless one considers avoiding punishment for a crime
committed compensation-but rather a recognition that the right
against illegal search must be respected by the judicial process.
Rights have other consequences, even when the rights-holder
does not, or cannot, sue for remedy. A criminal defendant may raise
a potential juror's right not to be excluded from the jury on
protected grounds as a basis for invalidating a conviction.46 The
44. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 214 (Dover 1991) (1881).
45. See Immanuel Kant, On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Political
Right, in Kant's Political Writings 73, 73 (H. Reiss, ed. 1999) (1793).
46. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986)
("[Tihe Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors
solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will
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juror's right is not directly remedied, but, one hopes, future
violations of the equal protection rights of other jurors are deterred.
Importantly, both members of Congress and state legislators, if
they are doing their job properly, take federal constitutional and
statutory obligations into account when devising legislative
solutions.47  The judicial doctrine of constitutional avoidance so
assumes, and therefore determines the meaning of statutes against the
presumption that Congress would not seek to tread on individual
rights,4 another example of the ways in which rights exert legal
influence quite apart from their ability to sound in tort should they be
breached.
To state that rights and remedies are analytically distinct, and that
one may logically exist without the other, does not itself answer the
question that the Supreme Court has wrestled with for decades:
When may an individual whose rights have been infringed invoke the
remedial power of the federal courts? Two lines of cases map the
Supreme Court's efforts: implied right of action cases, and cases
attempting to determine the scope of Section 1983, an express cause
of action.
One way in which an individual becomes entitled to obtain a
remedy in court is if Congress, in a statute, explicitly confers that
right. Another is through statutes (and indeed the Constitution itself)
that do not include an express right of action but nevertheless are
recognized as giving rise to remedies in federal court. The
preeminent example is the 1971 case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents ofFederal Bureau ofNarcotics,49 in which the Supreme Court
recognized that the federal courts are available for claims that federal
officers violated an individual's constitutional rights, even though the
Constitution does not provide an express right of action.
Section 1983 complements Bivens by providing an independent,
express right of action for people whose rights have been infringed by
state actors. The rights can have their origin in the Constitution or in
be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant.").
47. See Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943, 1947 (2003) ("The policentric model holds that for
purposes of Section 5 power the Constitution should be regarded as having multiple
interpreters, both political and legal. The model attributes equal interpretive
authority to Congress and to the Court.").
48. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 n.12, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2279
n. 12 (2001) ("Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold
the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress
intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power
constitutionally forbidden it.") (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 108 S. Ct. 1392 (1988)).
49. 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).
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federal statutes. The significance of Section 1983 cannot be
overstated: Without some means of enforcing the rights "secured" by
the Constitution and federal laws, there is always the risk, indeed the
probability, that in some instances rights will be of little more than
hortatory value.
That unenforceable rights would be ignored was precisely the
concern that gave rise to Section 1983 in the first place. In the
aftermath of the Civil War, Congress proposed, and the states of the
former Confederacy were required to ratify, the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which enunciated, inter alia,
the right to due process and equal protection, and, for newly-freed
slaves, the right to vote. It quickly became clear, however, that while
the amendments had sufficed to create these rights, African-
Americans in the South were faced with state governments unable or
unwilling to play their role in the tripartite relationship of rights-
holder, potential rights-infringer, and state. Congress then passed, in
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the statute that became Section 1983,
providing for access to the federal courts by anyone "depriv[ed] of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws" by a person acting "under color of' state law.
For the ensuing half-century, Section 1983 was only rarely
invoked-nineteen cases were brought under Section 1983 between
1871 and 1936 50-- but federal litigation for vindication of individual
constitutional rights grew substantially thereafter. Especially after the
Supreme Court in 1961 gave a broad construction to the words "under
color of' state law,51 Section 1983 put teeth in the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses and, through incorporation into the Due
Process Clause, the Bill of Rights. By way of Section 1983,
individuals had both federal rights and access to the federal courts to
remedy constitutional wrongs committed by persons acting under
color of state authority.
The next question faced by the Supreme Court as it contemplated
Section 1983 suits was whether Congress actually meant to allow
50. James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy. 38
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 393, 412 n.81 (2003) (citing Peter H. Schuck, Suing
Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 199 (1983)); see generally id.
at 412-13 (noting that Bivens was decided against a historical backdrop in which:
"Despite its ambitious ideals and broad wording, § 1983 was inexplicably almost
never utilized for more then seventy years .... While the Civil War fundamentally
realigned the relationship between the federal government and the states, it took
some time before it became common for individuals to appeal directly to the
Constitution as a source of individual rights .... With the creation of the
constitutional tort remedy, the Court established a system where the Constitution
rather than state common law governs the prerogative of federal and state officials
to inflict injury upon individuals.").
51. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
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individuals to sue to enforce "rights" created by all federal laws, as
the plain statutory language indicates. That question was finally
settled, after considerable disputation based on murky historical
materials, in Maine v. Thiboutot.52 Thiboutot reaffirmed several
earlier cases so holding, and several attempts in Congress thereafter
to eliminate the remedy accorded under Section 1983 for violations
of federal statutes failed.53
The history of the interpretation of Section 1983, up to and
including the Court's decision in Thiboutot, is a chronicle of
enforcing an expressed congressional intent to provide remedies
wherever there is a cognizable right, whether statutory or
constitutional. By the time of Thiboutot, however, the history of the
implied right of action cases had taken a different turn, one
characterized by an uncoupling of rights and remedies theretofore
foreign to federal jurisprudence
The very concept-not to mention the term-of an implied right
of action was unknown in the federal courts until at least the 1960s.
Instead, the Marbury v. Madison maxim that the legal system will
provide a remedy for infringement of a right held sway with regard to
statutory as well as constitutional rights.
For example, in 1893, Congress enacted the Federal Safety
Appliance Acts, which mandated that railways provide certain safety
features on trains for workers. Several years later, a railway company
employee named Rigsby fell off a rail car because of a defective
handhold. Rigsby brought suit in federal court against the company,
invoking the federal act section requiring secure handholds. Unlike
Section 1983, there was no explicit statutory language in the Federal
Safety Appliance Acts that Rigsby could point to as providing him
with a right (1) to come to court and (2) to compel the entity that
violated the statute and thereby injured him to pay for the harm
caused. Instead, the statute was silent about whether employees could
sue to enforce its dictates. Nonetheless, the Court allowed the suit for
damages to go forward:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act,
and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover
52. 448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
53. See H.R. 7686, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S. 3114, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980); S. 584, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); 127 Cong. Rec. 3209 (Feb. 26, 1981)
(remarks of Sen. Hatch); Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of
the Committee on the Judiciary, UnitedStates Senate, 97th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1981);
S. 81, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 436, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 325,
100th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1987). All of the Senate bills would have amended Section
1983 by striking "and laws" and substituting "and by any law providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."
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the damages from the party in default is implied .... This is
but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium
[Where there is a right, there is a remedy].54
To the legal mind trained at the turn of the twentieth century,
there would be no apparent problem here. Congress, through
legislation, determined that certain acts were unlawful. The railroad
broke the law. Those injured as a result'sued to make the company
comply with the statute, and the courts could both enjoin the railroad
from continuing its unlawful action and award damages to the injured
employee.
One reason for the Court's lack of concern over whether there was
an express, congressionally-approved right of action may be that the
federal courts at that time were still broadly creating federal common
law." In Rigsby, the Court relied on the following "doctrine of the
common law:" "So, in every case, where a statute enacts, or prohibits
a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the
same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the
recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law."56
The enactment and judicial development of the Railway Labor
Act, passed in 1926, provides a more nuanced look at the ability of
individuals to enforce their rights as established by legislation. In the
Transportation Act of 1920, Congress had created the Railroad Labor
Board to make decisions on employee representation, wages, and so
forth. These decisions were supposed to aid in defusing labor
disputes before employees went on strike. But when employees
attempted to enforce the Board's decisions by bringing suit in federal
court to enjoin employers from disregarding them, the Supreme Court
54. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40,36 S. Ct. 482,489
(1916). In a recent case considering whether a federal remedy exists under Section
1983 for claims of state malicious prosecution, Rigsby was invoked to argue against
any federal cause of action. See Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 962 (5th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (Barksdale J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The starting
point for the new § 1983 claim's being erroneous is the maxim 'Ubi jus, ibi
remedium'-'Where there is a right, there is a remedy.' See, e.g., [Rigsby]. Our
federal system counterpoint is: 'Where there is a right, there may not be a federal
law remedy.' Restated, it may be that the remedy must be through state law. This
reflects, among other things, the limited powers granted by our federal constitution,
the concomitant limited role of federal courts, and the proper balance between state
and federal law.").
55. In a later case interpreting Rigsby, Justice Powell, dissenting, emphasized
the pre-Erie context in which Rigsby was decided: "Under the regime of Swift v.
Tyson, then in force, the Court was free to create the substantive standards of
liability applicable to a common-law negligence claim brought in federal court."
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 732, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1976 (1979)
(citation omitted).
56. 241 U.S. at 39, 36 S. Ct. at 484.
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determined that Congress could not have intended the Board's
decisions to be enforceable by the federal courts. Instead, these
decisions were solely to be supported by the force of public opinion.17
This decision sent Congress back to the drawing board to craft a
corrective statute. The resulting Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45
U.S.C. § 151 et seq., the product of negotiations between railway
companies and employee representatives, did not contain any
language that explicitly allowed individuals to bring suits in federal
court to enforce their rights as expressed in the RLA.
When unions tried to enforce the RLA, they were met with the
argument that, like the Transportation Act before it, the RLA merely
conferred "an abstract right which was not intended to be enforced by
legal proceedings."58 But this time the Supreme Court would not
accept the view that Congress had created rights beyond the authority
of courts to enforce. Stressing that the RLA imposed explicit, certain,
and definite obligations upon the parties involved, not vague, general
exhortations, the Court did not credit the notion that obligations
defined by Congress in terms sufficiently clear for court interpretation
were unenforceable. Once more the Court referred to the old maxim,
"the right is created and the remedy exists," and once again it held
that courts have the generative authority to supply remedial schemes
that give life to inchoate but specific statutory rights.
Later cases, as well, indicate that as long as it appeared that
Congress intended to create a clearly defined obligation or right, the
courts routinely exercised their power to enforce such rights. Using
language no federal court would now utter, the Supreme Court in
1944 pronounced: "[These rights] would be sacrificed or obliterated
if [they] were without the remedy which courts can give for breach of
such [duties] or obligation[s] and which it is their duty to give in
cases in which they havejurisdiction."' 9 Similarly, in 1964, the Court
advised that "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose."'
In short, the Supreme Court used to have a vision that federal
courts are entrusted in part with redressing violations of rights
conferred upon individuals by federal statutes. In the past, federal
57. Penn. R.R. Co. v. U.S. R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72, 84,43 S. Ct. 278,283
(1923) ("Under the act there is no constraint upon [the parties] to do what the Board
decides they should do except the moral constraint . . .of publication of its
decision.").
58. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548,
558, 50 S. Ct. 427, 428 (1930).
59. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 207, 65 S. Ct.
226, 234 (1944).
60. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433, 84 S. Ct. 1555, 1560 (1964).
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courts, reflecting the Supreme Court's approach, consistently found
remedies whenever such violations were brought before them.
The uncoupling of rights and remedies in federal statutory cases
occurred gradually during the course of the 1970s. In a series of
cases, the Court first retreated from the broad "where there is a right,
there is a remedy" maxim to consider factors other than the existence
of a sufficiently specific statutory right. At first, the decisions
included specific indications of congressional intent only as one of
several such considerations. Then, as time went on, the Court
declared that specific congressional intent to permit suits in federal
court was the only relevant factor, abandoning any independent
judicial role of ensuring redress for violation of federally-created
rights.
Recently, the two lines of cases just described, on the availability
of Section 1983 and on implied private rights of action, have begun
to merge into a single doctrine. This trend came to a head in a
Supreme Court decision in 2002, Gonzaga University v. Doe.6' In
Gonzaga University, a plaintiff proceeding as John Doe sued his
former university for informing the Washington state teacher
certification agency that he was alleged to have engaged in sexual
misconduct as a student. Doe sued under Section 1983, alleging that
the disclosure violated the federal Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974.
The Privacy Act does not state that any judicial remedy is
available to individuals harmed by violations of the law. Had Doe
sued in 1899 or even in 1964, he could have argued that the Act
nonetheless conferred substantive privacy rights upon him-I am
leaving aside here some complications regarding the exact nature of
the statute, a condition on grants of funds to the states, as a matter for
another day -and that the federal judiciary should therefore, given its
role of redressing violations of rights, devise an appropriate remedy.
As a consequence of the demise of the private right of action
doctrine, Doe did not attempt that approach. Instead, he maintained
that he had a cause of action through the express terms of
Section 1983, as he was deprived of a right, secured by federal law,
by persons acting under color of state law. The defendants argued,
however, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the Privacy Act could
not be enforced in a Section 1983 suit because the statute did not
create any enforceable rights.62
61. 536 U.S. 273, 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002).
62. For an analogous result involving an administrative regulation, see Save
Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003), a decision from which
I dissented. See also Recent Cases: Federal Courts-Civil Rights
Litigation-Ninth Circuit Holds That an Administrative Regulation Can Never
Create an Individual Federal Right Enforceable Through § 1983, 117 Harv. L.
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The line of cases from Thiboutot through Blessing had recognized
that federal rights could be inferred from the intent and structure of
the law in question. Gonzaga University raised the bar. Now, it
appears, nothing "short of an unambiguously conferred right [will]
support a cause of action brought under § 1983," and, to confer such
a right, Congress must use "rights-creating language."63 For this
proposition the Court drew almost exclusively on the implied right of
action cases, announcing that those cases "should guide the
determination of whether a statute confers rights enforceable under §
1983."'4
In the implied right of action cases, however, the courts were
trying to discern, under the new doctrine, intimations of congressional
intent regarding whether private enforcement of a statute was
permitted. It was toward that end that explicit rights-conferring
language was deemed critical, on the assumption that only such
definite language would be sufficient to indicate that Congress meant
to allow individuals thus singled out to come to federal court for
relief even though there was no express cause of action applicable.
Gonzaga University thus weakened the analytic distinction
between rights and remedies that I have been stressing, suggesting
that there may be instances when, because there is no remedy, there
must not be a right either. Yet Section 1983, the great post-Civil War
civil rights statute, was, as we have seen, enacted precisely to provide
judicial redress for violations of federal rights-including, as
Thiboutot held, statutory as well as constitutional rights-where the
rights-creating document does not. Indeed, the text of the
Constitution only confers rights; judicial remedies for violations of
constitutional rights are grounded either in Section 1983, or, as in
Bivens actions, inferred from the Constitution.
Even many constitutional provisions long enforced under Section
1983 would not meet the standard Gonzaga University borrowed
from the implied right of action cases. The First Amendment, for
example, has always been understood to create individual rights to
Rev. 735 (2003) (agreeing with my position in Save Our Valley); Charles Davant
IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer's Apprentice?: Federal Agencies and the Creation of
Individual Rights, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 613 (disagreeing with my position in Save
Our Valley).
63. Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 283,287,122 S. Ct. at 2275,2277. AsInoted
in dissent in Save Our Valley, it is possible that Gonzaga University applies only
to statutes grounded in the Spending Clause, and that the prior, less language-
focused standard applies otherwise. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 961 n.13
(Berzon, J., dissenting); see also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 117, 114 S.
Ct. 2068, 2075 (1994) (holding that a non-Spending Clause statute can create rights
by structural implication); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475
U.S. 608, 618, 106 S. Ct. 1395, 1400-01 (1986) (same).
64. Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 283, 122 S. Ct. at 2275.
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freedom of speech, religion, and press. But the text of the
Amendment is only that "Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion], or abridging the freedom of speech or
of the press." In contrast, the Fourth Amendment does speak of "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons." Applying the
standard suggested in Gonzaga University, one might think that the
First Amendment is not enforceable under Section 1983, as it does
not contain "rights-creating language," while the Fourth Amendment
is, because it does employ such language.
A more likely inference, I strongly suspect, is that the Court does
not mean to indicate that traditionally-recognized constitutional
rights, however articulated, are to be subjected to the language-based
standards for rights-creation articulated in the private right of action
cases and in Gonzaga University. A clue that this is the case is the
Bivens anomaly: with all the retrenchment in the implication of
judicial remedies, there has been no suggestion of which I am aware
that Bivens is of questionable validity.
Instead, explicit in both the statutory private right of action cases
and in the Section 1983 statutory rights cases culminating in Gonzaga
University is a separation of powers concern, a determination that it
is for Congress and not the courts to prescribe the remedies available
for violations of federal statutes, while courts are the principal
institutions charged with enforcement of constitutional rights.
Gonzaga University also noted that, in the context of Section 1983
suits against state entities, federalism concerns arise as well. Quoting
from Will, the Court stated in Gonzaga University that "if Congress
intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States
and the Federal Government', it must make its intention to do so
'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.""'65
In the private right of action context, in my view, the emphasis on
separation of powers concerns has considerable force; at least once
Congress has been told of the withdrawal of the background
understanding that the federal courts will devise remedies for
violations of congressionally-conferred rights. For earlier-enacted
statutes, as some but not all of the more recent private right of action
cases have recognized, any fair judgment regarding congressional
intent must take into account the likely expectation that remedies did
not need to be spelled out with precision because the courts would
provide them where necessary.
Section 1983, however, is another matter entirely. That statute
was, as we have seen, enacted precisely to ensure judicial remedies,
and precisely because of a special concern with the need for federal
remedies to "secure" federal rights against state infringement.
65. Id. at 286, 122 S. Ct. at 2277.
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Section 1983, in other words, was passed to codify the "where there
is a right, there is a remedy" maxim, precluding for cases within its
reach the kind of retrenchment regarding the scope of federal
judicial remedies that has occurred with regard to private causes of
action generally. Any separation of powers analysis, consequently,
must take into account that original, expressed congressional intent
and give effect to it.
Further, protection of federal statutory rights is at bottom the
protection of federal constitutional rights, given the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution. The legislative history of Section 1983
has been read to so reflect, and the addition of the term "laws" to
the current version of Section 1983 can be explained precisely by
the concern to make clear that Supremacy Clause violations, as well
as others, are covered.66
Section 1983, therefore, directly addressed the intended
constitutional balance between the states and the federal
government, without the need for elaboration in this regard by later
Congresses. Rather, as long as a federal statutory enactment can be
understood as creating a "right" in the functional sense I have
described, no intention by the Congress that enacted the statute is
pertinent to the question whether there is a cause of action under
Section 1983. And in determining whether a statutory enactment
has created a "right," just as constitutional language is, as I have
shown, not determinative, so congressional language, rather than
the actual attributes of the asserted right, is not terribly useful in
deciding whether a particular statute is of the type covered by
Section 1983.
66. See Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement ofFederal
Law, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 394,409 (1982) (concluding with respect to Section 1983,
its predecessor statute of 1871, and relevant legislative history that: "It is no doubt
true that Congress was primarily concerned with providing a remedy for
constitutional violations and unlawful invasions of rights protected by civil rights
laws. But it is consistent with the historical evidence to understand the underlying
purposes as more general than that, reaching all violations of federal law. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that the predecessor to section 1983 made laws
other than the civil rights laws enforceable against the states at the time of the
revision [of 1874]."). In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600,
99 S. Ct. 1905 (1979), Justice Powell noted in a concurring opinion that while
Congress may have intended to include protection of federal statutory rights in its
1871 legislation, the impression of the Commissioners appointed shortly thereafter
to revise the nation's laws was that courts could conclude that "only such rights as
are specifically secured by the Constitution, and not every right secured by a law
authorized by the Constitution, were.., intended." Id. at 631-32 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (quoting Revision of the United States Statutes as Drafted by the
Commissioners Appointed for That Purpose 362 (1872)). The addition of "laws"
in the 1874 revision that created present Section 1983 eliminated this ambiguity
identified by the Commissioners.
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Of course, later Congresses can, with respect to particular statutes,
decide that enforcement under Section 1983 should not be available.
Well-developed doctrine, usually denominated as the Sea Clammers
principle after the Supreme Court case in which it was announced,6 7
so recognizes, and sets out how to determine whether a later Congress
intended for a particular statute to be enforced against state actors
through means provided within the statute itself, rather than via
Section 1983. That is the proper inquiry regarding the role of later-
enacted statutes in limiting the application of the fundamental Civil
Rights statute-did the later Congress withdraw the default Section
1983 remedy in favor of another? As repeals by implication are,
traditionally, disfavored,6" the circumstances in which such
withdrawal of the Section 1983 remedy should be, and have been,
found are relatively rare.69
Enforcing a right to educational privacy protected by a federal
statute may seem far removed from enforcing, as Judge Rubin did in
the Tangipahoa Parish case, the equal protection right to desegregated
schools. But insofar as the basic issue addressed by Section 1983, the
obligation of states to accord rights legitimately conferred upon
citizens by the federal government, is concerned, the pertinent
considerations differ little. Also, and critically, in most, although not
all, instances, the individuals seeking to enforce federal statutory
"rights" through Section 1983 are the least privileged and empowered
among us-single parents seeking child support, as in Blessing, or
indigent parents seeking health care for their children, as in Frew. So
while the problems have changed, the need for remedies as well as
rights to improve people's lives endures. My conclusion, then, is that
Section 1983 incorporated into federal law-for those more recent
cases as well as for the school desegregation cases of the 1960s-the
common law maxim proclaimed in Marbury, and removed it from the
realm ofjudge-made rules, which can be modified or abandoned as
times change.
The remedies implemented during Judge Rubin's years on the
bench filled some shameful holes in the enforcement of our laws and
individual rights. While the issues brought to court today are
different, and may be less cataclysmic to the individuals affected,
67. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
68. See, e.g., Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119,
132, 123 S. Ct. 1239, 1248 (2003).
69. See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 347-48, 117 S. Ct. 1353,
1362 (rejecting argument that Section 1983 was not available as a remedy because
of remedies available in the statute providing the right and noting that: "Only twice
have we found a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant § 1983:
in Sea Clammers ... and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).").
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rights deprivation remains tantamount to the denial ofjustice. Resort
to the courts for a remedy is a critical means of seeking redress in
many circumstances. Where, as in applying Section 1983, judges
have been accorded authority to provide remedies, it is our duty to do
so, rather than leaving rights inchoate and abstract, without substance
in real people's lives.
Examples like Judge Rubin's, with his legacy of 1,079 published
opinions," loom large in our personal and judicial pantheons. The
imperative becomes to draw strength from the past and channel,
rather than succumb to, what the literary critic Harold Bloom calls the
author's anxiety of influence, the apprehension "that greatness may
be unable to renew itself, that one's inspiration may be larger than
one's own powers of realization."7
Justice Ginsburg last year concluded a lecture on "Four Louisiana
Giants in the Law" with a quotation from Judge John Minor
Wisdom's eulogy to Judge Rubin: "[W]ith his encyclopedic
knowledge of the law and towering intellect, he was able to find
means of redressing unfairness, within the bounds of legal propriety,
when others might have despaired and yielded to circumstances
apparently beyond their control. 72 I have attempted in these remarks
to show how the "bounds of legal propriety" have shifted for federal
rights and remedies in the last thirty years. The more doctrine
changes, however, the more evident it is how our task as federal
judges remains the same: to find those means.
70. David W. Robertson, Judge Rubin 's Maritime Tort Decisions, 52 La. L.
Rev. 1527, 1527 (1992).
71. Harold Bloom, Genius: A Mosaic of One Hundred Exemplary Creative
Minds 6 (2002).
72. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Four Louisiana Giants in the Law, 48 Loy. L. Rev.
253, 266 (2002).
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